

Re-reading the 2011 English riots

*ESRC ‘Beyond Contagion’
interim report*

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1. Who we are

The authors of this interim report on the ESRC 'Beyond Contagion' project are John Drury (University of Sussex), Roger Ball (Keele University and University of Sussex), Fergus Neville (University of St Andrews), Stephen Reicher (University of St Andrews), and Clifford Stott (Keele University). We are a group of social psychologists and a historian who have been researching crowds, riots and other forms of collective behaviour for over 30 years. Others involved in the project include Linda Bell, Mikey Biddlestone, Andrea Boardman, Sanj Choudhury, Tomas Hajek, Philipp Jabold, Thomas Johnson, Max Lovell, Cassie Lowery, Evans Ndiema, Becca Phillips, Shuqi Quan, Caoimhe Ryan, Anna Breian Tskhovrebova, Tam Vo, Clement Yeung (all Sussex, St Andrews, or Keele), and Daniel Richardson (UCL).

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More about this project, who we are, and our other work on crowds and riots can be found here:
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/beyondcontagion>

As this is an interim report, some of the findings reported here have not yet been through peer review. Where there is a published source, this is indicated.

2. Executive summary

2.1 Background to the 2011 riots

- While an extraordinary amount has been written and said about the 2011 English riots, very little has been based on systematic evidence. The present interim report summarizes findings so far from a research programme based on a comprehensive data-set, which seeks to develop a new way of talking and thinking about the process by which riots spread from location to location.
- Some of the dominant accounts of the riots - as mindless destruction or 'criminality pure and simple'¹ - obscure understanding and feed into flawed policy responses.
- This study drew upon multiple archive sources, interviews with rioters (gathered as part of the *Guardian*/LSE *Reading the Riots* project), contextual information about riot locations, and police crime data. We used these data to construct histories of some of the most significant riots in August 2011, to test predictive models, and to analyse participants' experiences.

2.2 Myths of the riots

- The idea that those who participated were overwhelmingly convicted criminals or that their actions were typically indiscriminate are not supported by the Home Office's data.
- Like many other riots, the rioting in Tottenham happened after a drawn-out process rather than a single 'spark'. In each location, conflict with the police and power-reversal in a local deprived estate was often the point at which smaller skirmishes became a mass event.

2.3 Motives for the riots

- There were significant differences between London boroughs that saw rioting and those that did not. Immediately prior to the riots, the former had significantly more deprivation, many more police 'stop and searches', and more negative attitudes to the police.
- We found that anti-police sentiment among participants was a significant factor in who joined in and what they did. One reason given for this hostility was experiences of 'stop and search' in the community.
- Shared anti-police sentiment formed the basis of a common identity, superseding 'postcode rivalries', and enabling coordinated action against police targets.
- In addition, many people saw themselves in opposition to a societal system they perceived as unjust and illegitimate; this made looting acceptable to many of them.

2.4 Understanding the spread of the riots

- To explain waves of riots, in place of the concept of 'contagion' - the notion that people simply copied others in a mindless and automatic way - we propose a new model of riot spread as *identity-based collective empowerment*.
- Rioting spread in various different ways. The first spread - from Tottenham High Road to Tottenham Hale and Wood Green - occurred as police dispersed rioters yet were unable to prevent their actions.
- Here and elsewhere, there was a pattern whereby community or anti-police rioting was the basis of subsequent commodity rioting (involving looting) as well as attacks on wealth.
- Close examination of the spread of rioting from North to South London suggests that Brixton participants often identified with Tottenham, and were influenced to riot out of anger and a sense of injustice at the killing of Mark Duggan. This would explain why Brixton was the first place to riot in South London.
- Many more of those in Croydon and Clapham, however, were more influenced by the perception of police vulnerability across London. The impact of police vulnerability in providing 'vicarious' empowerment for those who identified as anti-police may have been a general process, explaining riot spread across England.
- In all the locations we looked at, local identities and networks mediated the impact of rioting in other locations: most people interviewed were influenced by what they thought relevant others locally were prepared to do.
- Some police tactics seem to have inadvertently facilitated spread to different locations. These tactics included clearing town centres of shoppers and using proactive methods in those locations they feared would riot.

¹<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2011/aug/09/david-cameron-riots-criminality-video>

3. Introduction

An extraordinary amount has been written and said about the 2011 riots. Unfortunately, much of this is speculation and is based on a lack of evidence. This is true of both most of the academic publications on the riots (over 150 journal articles, chapters and books at the last count) but also of the various policy-related claims and initiatives that followed the events. What is especially disturbing about the UK government's numerous claims about causation and their hastily-assembled policy initiatives is that these are not just abstract ideas but have real consequences for people's lives.

First there was the claim by government that the riots were led by 'gangs', and the hastily proposed appointment of a US 'Gangs Tzar' as the solution to this.² Then there was the 'Troubled Families' programme which was rushed out based on assumptions that family upbringing led young people to grow into the 'career criminals' supposedly behind the riots.³ Next, in the face of the evidence from the *Guardian/Reading the Riots* project that 'stop and search' was a major grievance for many of those involved in the riots, as well as the police's own evidence that its effectiveness is minimal,⁴ the 'solution' to knife-crime is... once again to increase 'stop and search'.⁵ Finally, the 'Gangs Matrix' programme designed to combat gang violence following the riots has now been discredited as racist.⁶

In writing the present interim report, we have taken the opposite approach to the UK government in many respects. A first key message of this report, therefore, is that *evidence is needed in understanding the 2011 riots*. This report is based on a comprehensive data-set and multi-method analysis; it summarizes the results of a series of studies that have been, or are in the process of being, submitted for publication via peer review.

A second key message is that *to depict the riots as simply mindless, purely criminal, or as meaningless obscures*

understanding. Years of research on riots has demonstrated that they are typically characterized by meaningful patterns, and it is the job of researchers to uncover and explain these patterns. This empirical approach puts rioting back into context, seeks to examine the social experience and understandings of rioters, and how we respond when we see others rioting. This is not about approving or disapproving of the riots, or about diminishing the seriousness of what happened; it is about better understanding so as to be better able to diagnose why they occur.

A third key message is that *existing accounts of the 2011 riots fail to explain the pattern of spread*. Like many urban riots, the 2011 events occurred in a wave. Yet not all places in the UK were affected. We need to explain why some places rioted and others do not; and for those places that did riot, we need to explain the sequence of events.

Our fourth and final key message, connecting the previous three, is that *we need a new way of talking and thinking about these and other riots, based around the concept of shared social identity*. The depictions of rioting as a meaningless outburst, purely reflecting flaws in the crowd (and therefore denying any social causation), are encapsulated in the notion of 'contagion'. Thus it is not only a lack of evidence, but a particular (loaded) discourse that obscures and distorts riots, that suggests false 'solutions', that draws attention away from deeper causes of these important events. *Shared social identity* - the sense of who 'we' are and our definition of proper and possible action in relation to others - is a concept that has been usefully employed to understand many forms of collective action, including riots,⁷ in peer-reviewed research going back over 30 years. We argue that it provides an insightful framework for understanding key elements of urban riots.

Urban riots can have significant economic and political impacts on a society, as well as profound psychological impacts on those that experience them.

² <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/aug/11/new-gangs-drive-signalled> In fact, the government very quickly abandoned claims that 'gangs' were responsible for the riots in the face of a lack of evidence for such claims. See Ball, R., & Drury, J. (2012). Representing the riots: The (mis)use of statistics to sustain ideological explanation. *Radical Statistics*, 106, 4-21.

³ This programme was subsequently shown to be ineffective: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/aug/08/13bn-troubled-families-scheme-has-had-no-discernible-impact>

⁴ https://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/SS_and_crime_report.pdf

⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2018/nov/11/uk-police-chiefs-hold-talks-to-expand-stop-and-search> Increasing 'stop and search' has been proposed not only by police chiefs but also by the London Mayor.

⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/21/metropolitan-police-gangs-matrix-review-london-mayor-discriminatory>

⁷ See Reicher, S. D. (1984). The St Pauls riot: An explanation of the limits of crowd action in terms of a social identity model. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 14, 1-21.

Waves of riots tell us about deep societal problems and widespread alienation. This is why we have to listen to them and this is why we need to engage with them with a new discourse. This interim report is a modest contribution to that new form of discourse.

The report is structured as follows. First we provide some background to the events and the dominant

'conversation' around these riots and riots in general. Next, we describe our methods and data. The rest of the report is organized around the main findings so far from our research, covering the predictors, experiences, and dynamics of the events, and focusing specifically on the question of how riots spread. Finally we draw out some implications of this analysis.

4. Background: Riots and the events of August 2011

The English riots of 2011 occurred over five days in August, and involved an estimated 20,000 people, with more than 5,000 arrests and costs of up to £500 million.⁸ It was the largest wave of riots in the UK since the 1980s and the most prolonged and widespread in London since the 1780 Gordon riots.⁹

The first rioting took place in Tottenham, two days after the fatal shooting by police of a local mixed-heritage man, Mark Duggan. Over the next 24 hours, rioting spread to other areas of London, and the next day to many other cities in England. Altogether 85 locations in 53 local authority areas were affected by disorder.

4.1 Three pseudo-explanations for riots and rioting

In mass media accounts and a number of government statements, three types of myths about riots were presented to characterize the events of 2011. These myths, which have a long history in public discourse about riots, can be summarized as '*the bad*', '*the mad*', and '*the bad leading the mad*':

- *The bad*. One of the most well-rehearsed (non)explanations of riots is that they are caused simply by a convergence of criminal individuals, or 'riff-raff', who are not sufficiently socialised, or who come from 'problem families'.
- *The mad*. This kind of explanation suggests that otherwise ordinary people become mindless and out of control when immersed in a crowd, evidenced by their supposedly indiscriminate

violence. In this account, rioting spreads easily through 'contagion' and 'copycat' behaviour.

- *The bad leading the mad*. This account combines the first two, by suggesting that powerful 'agitators' (or sometimes 'gangs') manipulate and exploit the gullible masses.

At one level these are different kinds of explanations - the first blames individuals, the second blames crowd psychology. But at another level they are similar, for what they have in common is the idea that the problem of riots lies with the rioters. These explanations serve to remove blame from anything or anybody outside the crowd: the actions of authorities, the policies of governments, inequalities or injustices in society. In the 1960s, for example, after the wave of urban riots against racism and police brutality in the United States, those in authority tried to argue that these events were unrepresentative of wider society, that only a small minority of 'marginal' or 'riot-prone' individuals were involved, and that the correct solution was increased use of coercion rather than measures to address inequalities in society.¹⁰

Over the years, evidence has amassed against these explanations.¹¹ Thus, the idea that rioters are typically marginal is flatly contradicted by evidence from the 1960s urban riots which showed that rioters were representative of their communities (and if anything slightly better educated than others).¹² The notion that rioting is mindless and rioters' behaviour typically indiscriminate has been contradicted by evidence from historians and social scientists on some

⁸ Riots, Communities and Victims Panel. (2011). *5 Days in August – An interim report on the 2011 English riots*.

⁹ Kawalerowicz, J., & Biggs, M. (2015). Anarchy in the UK: Economic deprivation, social disorganization, and political grievances in the London riot of 2011. *Social Forces*, 94, 673-698.

¹⁰ Fogelson, R. M. (1971). *Violence as protest: A study of riots and ghettos*. New York: Anchor

¹¹ For a summary of the evidence, see Reicher, S., & Stott, C. (2011). *Mad mobs and Englishmen? Myths and realities of the 2011 riots*. Hachette.

¹² Fogelson (1971) *op. cit.* National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968). *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. New York.

of the most violent crowd events, including the Watts riot of 1965, where there was selectivity of targets based on shared norms and values.¹³ And the idea that people in a crowd are so gullible that anyone with the right rhetoric can sway them to act in any direction has been contradicted again by the extensive programme of research on the US riots of the 1960s.¹⁴ On this point, numerous field studies and experiments show that leadership is a function of shared identity between crowd and leader; for influence to occur, the 'influencer' must be seen as ingroup to us and the actions they persuade us to take must be in line with our shared norms and values.¹⁵

We will describe below how our evidence from the 2011 riots also contradicts these and other pseudo-explanations. Our main focus is one particular idea which encapsulates many features of these myths (i.e., pathology, mindlessness, meaninglessness of actions): *contagion*.

4.2 What's wrong with 'contagion'?

The concept of 'contagion' is one of the most popular in social science, and is commonly employed to describe the spread of both simple behaviours (such as scratching, yawning, and smiling) as well as complex social phenomena, such as market 'panic' - and rioting. 'Contagion' is the idea that behaviours spread simply through exposure or contact (literal or metaphorical). The term comes from the Latin words '*con*' meaning 'together with' and '*tagere*' meaning 'to touch'.

One of the earliest usages of the term 'contagion' in a social science context was by the psycho-historian Hippolyte Taine, who borrowed concepts from medicine (including 'feverishness' and 'delirium') to describe what he saw as the primitive psychology of crowds.¹⁶ For Taine and the other 'crowd scientists' in nineteenth century Europe - most notably Gustave Le Bon - the revolutions in France, increased urbanization, and industrial unrest each represented the threat of the 'mass' to civilization. Therefore the aim of their 'science' was not only to understand the crowd but to combat it. The concept of 'contagion' was one of the weapons in this assault on the crowd. Le Bon defined 'contagion' as a form of uncritical social influence whereby any behaviour or sentiment sweeps through the crowd, and he advised authorities

on how to harness the malleability of the 'masses' to strengthen the old regime against the threat of democracy.

Clearly, therefore, the choice of the term 'contagion' to talk about social influence in crowds was not accidental. More neutral words such as 'transmission', 'spread' or 'influence' were rejected for a term that compared influence to a disease, that suggested that it was mindless, and that therefore implied that it was bad.

Today the concept of 'contagion' has gone far beyond its early beginnings in 'crowd science', but its association with primitive psychology is still strong. Its specific prediction is that mere exposure alone leads to spread of behaviour, something which occurs at a 'basic' level, 'beneath' cognition. Yet even studies of the most elementary responses provide evidence that the story is not so simple. People don't imitate uncritically; they evaluate the information, in particular its self-relevance, and this determines the action they take.

This point was nicely illustrated in an experiment on 'emotional contagion', which is supposedly automatic. The experiment showed that people were more likely to mimic the (angry, fearful) emotional reactions of a target who was 'ingroup' than one who was 'outgroup'.¹⁷ Our own experiments on social influence are not yet published, yet their pattern of results is remarkably similar to this finding.

First, we looked at scratching, which has previously been found to be extremely 'contagious'. As well as observing their behaviour, we measured people's identification with particular social groups we made salient (e.g., students). We found that, for those people who identified strongly with the group, seeing a fellow ingroup member scratching was likely to make them feel itchy, and this itchiness predicted the number of times they scratched themselves. We found almost exactly the same pattern of results with yawning, which has been said to be the most primitively 'contagious' behaviour of them all. Finally, in a group maze task, we found that, rather than mindlessly following anyone, participants were more likely to follow those they were told were their ingroup members.

¹³ Fogelson (1971) *op. cit.*

¹⁴ National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) *op. cit.*

¹⁵ Haslam, S. A., Reicher, S. D., & Platow, M. J. (2010). *The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power*. Psychology Press.

¹⁶ Stott, C., & Drury, J. (2017). Contemporary understanding of riots: Classical crowd psychology, ideology and the social identity approach. *Public Understanding of Science*, 26, 2-14.

¹⁷ Van der Schalk, J., Fischer, A., Doosje, B., Wigboldus, D., Hawk, S., Rotteveel, M., & Hess, U. (2011). Convergent and divergent responses to emotional displays of ingroup and outgroup. *Emotion*, 11, 286-298.

Evidence that mere exposure is insufficient for behavioural spread, and that identity matters, problematize the ‘contagion’ concept. If just seeing a yawn doesn’t after all automatically make us yawn, we need to look at how people *think* about what they are exposed to and its *relevance* to them and to the identities that are important to them.

Of course, the spread of rioting is a much more complex phenomenon than scratching or yawning. This is why, in order to develop a new way of talking and thinking about the spread of behaviour in this context, we needed an appropriate methodology.

5. The need for evidence: Our methods

In our study of the 2011 riots, we sought to utilise data from as many sources as possible in order to provide the most comprehensive analysis.

5.1 ‘Reading the Riots’ interviews

We had access to the *Guardian*/LSE *Reading the Riots*¹⁸ interview data-set that was gathered in the months immediately after the events in 2011. A team of 17 interviewers used local contacts to recruit people involved in the riots, the majority of whom had not at that point been arrested. There were 270 such transcripts, which were redacted to remove identifying information.

5.2 Contemporaneous and archive data

We made use of over 150 newspaper sources, over 40 official reports, over 100 journal articles, over 250 videos (including both footage and interviews), a database of 2.6 million riot-related tweets, seven field trips, and hundreds of photographs.

5.3 Police data

We had access to the Home Office compilation of police data on arrestees and criminal offences during the riots, as well as more detailed data-sets from a number of individual police forces. This comprised data on over 5,000 offences and over 4,000 arrestees.

5.5 Methods of analysis

This comprehensive data-set enabled us to do three things. First, it allowed us to construct a detailed objective description of some of the major riots in

August 2011. To substantiate the veracity of the timing, location, and content of a particular incident, we triangulated three types of information: post-event accounts by participants and eye-witnesses; real-time media recorded during the events; and physical evidence of the actions of the crowd. To date, we have produced detailed triangulated accounts of the riots in Haringey borough (Tottenham, Tottenham Hale, and Wood Green),¹⁹ Enfield,²⁰ Brixton, Clapham, Croydon borough, Salford, Manchester city centre, and Birmingham. In each case, we constructed a detailed timeline which formed the basis of the detailed descriptive account.

Second, our comprehensive data-set enabled us to develop predictive models of some of the factors behind some of the pattern of events. Here we made particular use of the police crime data as dependent measures, but also included a number of other predictor variables.

Third, we analysed participants’ interview accounts so that we could examine their experiences of events, to complement the objective evidence. The subjective accounts of participants allows us to explore their understandings and feelings to determine *why* things happened. For this, we used thematic analysis to examine patterns of meaning in the transcripts.

The points below are a summary and distillation of the results so far of these different methodological techniques and strategies.

¹⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/series/reading-the-riots>

¹⁹ <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=full-triangulated-account---haringey.pdf&site=557>

²⁰ <https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=full-triangulated-account---enfield.pdf&site=557>

6. What drove the riots?

6.1 Beyond ‘pure criminality’

We have shown²¹ that the statistics that the then Prime Minister and other senior politicians used to support their claim that the 2011 riots were ‘criminality pure and simple’²² were highly problematic:

‘Criminal’ and ‘criminality’ were amongst the most frequently occurring words used to refer to the UK riots.²³ On the one hand, as a description of illegal activities the term ‘criminal’ was clearly technically correct. On the other hand, a different kind of claim was made, particularly by senior politicians, when it was stated that most of those who took part already had criminal records and convictions (and thus were already ‘criminals’). This kind of claim included statements about the ‘hardcore’ made by the Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke in September 2011:

*‘It’s not yet been widely recognised, but the hardcore of the rioters were in fact known criminals. Close to three quarters of those aged 18 or over charged with riot offences already had a prior conviction... In my view, the riots can be seen in part as an outburst of outrageous behaviour by the criminal classes – individuals and families familiar with the justice system, who haven’t been changed by their past punishments.’*²⁴

Home Secretary Theresa May continued with this characterization of the ‘majority’ in a speech given in December 2011:

*‘...three-quarters of those who appeared in court in connection with the riots already had a previous caution or conviction. On average each rioter charged had committed 11 previous offences. In other words, they were career criminals’*²⁵

A serious issue, however, was that the figures on which these statements were based were *arrest figures*. Several police sources indirectly drew attention to the problems in using these figures to characterise the composition of the ‘rioting’ crowds in August 2011, when they acknowledged the pressure they were under to make arrests.²⁶ We argued:

Clearly, such pressure was leading to the path of least resistance in terms of sweeping up possible suspects. This involved concentrating on those who were already within police databases and/or under investigation and fitted the criminal profile of a potential ‘rioter’ or ‘looter’ in a particular area...

Public statements that most rioters were already ‘criminals’ treated as unproblematic the circular way that the data was produced, with those already known to the police most likely to be identified and arrested. This simple statistical flaw did not restrain politicians from knowingly (or unknowingly) using the data to both characterise the August riots and define policy responses.²⁷

6.2 There were significant differences between those locations in London that saw rioting and those that did not

We compared London boroughs that saw rioting (26) with those that did not (6).²⁸ We looked at different predictors and different measures of the extent of rioting, to get a fuller picture of some of the underlying factors.

6.2.1 Deprivation was the strongest predictor of whether a riot occurred in a London borough²⁹

There were significantly greater numbers of deprived people in the boroughs that saw rioting than in those

²¹ Ball & Drury (2012) *op. cit.*

²² <http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/08/prime-minister-communities>

²³ Reicher & Stott (2011) *op. cit.*

²⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/05/kenneth-clarke-riots-penal-system>

²⁵ <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2075540/Theresa-May-lessons-SHE-learnt-weeks-LSE-report-summer-riots.html> 18-12-2011

²⁶ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/dec/08/boy-riots-arrested-tv-cameras>

²⁷ Ball & Drury (2012) *op. cit.*

²⁸ We excluded the City of London from this analysis.

²⁹ The measures we used here were the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation overall score, plus the proportion of a local authority district’s population living in the most deprived LSOAs in the country.

that did not see rioting. In addition, the greater numbers of deprived people in a borough, the greater the *number of recorded riot offences* in a borough³⁰ and the longer the *duration of rioting* within a borough.

6.2.2 The boroughs with more ‘stop and search’ in the two-and-a-half years beforehand were those more likely to see rioting in August 2011³¹

Just to illustrate this point, the population-adjusted average number of ‘stop and searches’ in 2010 in the boroughs that saw rioting was 8,442 per 100,000 population, which was more than double the average number (4,141) for those boroughs that didn’t see rioting.³²

6.2.3 Prior attitudes to policing predicted number of riots per borough

Attitudes to policing were measured in a 2011 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) survey that sampled 9,660 people in all the London boroughs in the months before the August riots. Public attitudes that the MPS did not treat people with respect and did not engage well with all members of the community were the strongest predictor of the *number of riots per borough*. These same public attitudes, plus another part of the survey measuring the extent to which the public felt they had control over local policing, were major predictors of the *number of recorded riot offences* in a borough.³³ In other words, those boroughs in which people saw the police negatively and felt alienated from them were those that later saw the most rioting.

6.3 Anti-police sentiments were pivotal

While *Reading the Riots* and other previous research has documented widespread anti-police feeling among 2011 rioters,³⁴ our analysis adds to this by suggesting that rioters used their views of the police to *define themselves collectively*. As we show, these shared anti-police views also (a) enabled people to *act collectively*; (b) were the basis of ‘vicarious’ *empowerment* (i.e., people empowered by police vulnerability in other locations); and (c) hence were

an important mechanism of the *spread* of rioting between locations.




Photo courtesy of AP Images

6.3.1 Hostility to the police was shared; it formed a shared identity for many people

Many interviewees expressed long-standing anti-police feelings or attitudes. For example, the majority of interviewees from the Brixton, Croydon, and Clapham riots expressed these views. Indeed, anti-police feeling was the most prevalent theme of those we looked at in these locations. Participants referred to others in their local community as sharing similar hostilities, and references to ‘we’ and ‘us’, which are often markers of shared identity,³⁵ littered the accounts of antipathy to the police. Many interviewees explicitly suggested that anti-police feelings were the motivation for themselves or for other participants in the riots, particularly for the early stages.

In line with these attitudes, attacks on police were a feature of all the riots we looked at, though these kinds of incidents are routinely under-reported in the arrestee and crime data. Further, many of the initial attacks on property were understood by participants as attempts to ‘show’ the police what they could do, or to assert power over them. This was the case in the initial stages of rioting in Enfield, for example.

³⁰ Kawalerowicz & Biggs (2015) *op. cit.* show something similar, but with arrestee data. The advantage of the present analysis is it includes data on the actions of people who were not arrested, and is thus not subject to biases around who was apprehended.

³¹ The ‘stop and search’ figures are for 2009, 2010, and January–July 2011, adjusted for borough population size.

³² In addition, for the years 2010–2011 it was rare in any London borough that more than 1 in 10 people searched was arrested. During the period of enhanced searches undertaken in 2009 for Counter Terrorism purposes, these figures decreased to 1 in 20 in many boroughs. In Haringey, for example, only 4.8% of those stopped and searched were arrested in 2009, meaning that more than 30,000 unsuccessful searches were made in the borough that year.

³³ Kawalerowicz & Biggs (2015) *op. cit.* show something similar with the same MPS survey, but using arrestee data.

³⁴ Newburn, T., Diski, R., Cooper, K., Deacon, R., Burch, A., & Grant, M. (2018). ‘The biggest gang’? Police and people in the 2011 England riots. *Policing and Society*, 28, 205–222.

³⁵ Smith, L. G. E., Gavin, J., & Sharp, E. (2015). Social identity formation during the emergence of the occupy movement. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 45, 818–832.

6.3.2 Experiences of 'stop and search' - not just for individuals but experienced as an attack on the community - were common and were a motivator

In line with the statistical analysis (6.2 above), the interview data suggested an association between the riots and experiences of 'stop and search'. Thus in explaining their hatred of the police or their own or others' participation in the riots, a number of interviewees reported being previously subjected to police 'stop and search' or other humiliating forms of unfair police attention. A key feature of many of these accounts was that the humiliating treatment was *of their community*, not just themselves as an individual. In other words, they were experienced as an attack on 'us'.

6.3.3 Many people saw themselves in opposition to a societal system they perceived as unjust and illegitimate

Also common in the interview transcripts, and sometimes linked to anti-police feelings, was a sense of wider illegitimacy or alienation³⁶ that took in a variety of types of structural disadvantage. This made looting acceptable to many. Participants referred to cuts to youth funding, or increasing poverty, or to other economic disadvantages affecting young people, their community or reference group. Many linked particular disadvantages to their long-standing opposition to the government or the social system more generally. As with anti-police feelings, their alienation was often presented as a shared experience, and 'we'-talk in this context was common.

6.3.4 'Postcode rivalries' were superseded

For many young people in London, 'postcode rivalries' shape where they feel able to go and their group loyalties. One of the most striking findings

from the analysis of participant interviews, however, was that these long-standing hostilities were overcome within the riots:

shared historical experiences of antagonism with police appears to have afforded an opportunity for these participants to understand that they actually shared a collective identity in the context of police disempowerment.³⁷

In Haringey, for example, one participant described the looting in Wood Green as a novel positive experience of 'community' precisely because of the supersession of these rivalries:

A: You know what? Out of all of the whole thing, like, I saw communities coming together [laughs]. I know it's a bad thing, for like, everyone but at the end of the day I saw the community coming together. Q: How so?

A: Because like, usually, cos it's postcode gangs and that lot, like Hornsey, they have differences with Wood Green. But then again, when the riots came, I saw Wood Green and Hornsey people just walking past each other like it was nothing like 'oh help me with this', and 'you will get some of this' and just 'help me out' and that's just. It brought people together because, now, it's like I don't see a problem with any kind of area.'³⁸

The *Guardian*/LSE analysis of these data has previously made this same point.³⁹ However, what we have been able to show in addition is the way this supersession of postcode rivalries occurred within particular riot events and was *part of the dynamic* whereby participants reversed the power of the police.⁴⁰

³⁶ Newburn, T., Deacon, R., Diski, B., Cooper, K., Grant, M., & Burch, A. (2016). 'The best three days of my life': Pleasure, power and alienation in the 2011 riots. *Crime, Media, Culture*, 14, 41-59.

³⁷ Stott C., Ball, R., Drury, J., Neville, F., Reicher, S., Boardman, A., & Choudhury, S. (2018). The evolving normative dimensions of 'riot': Toward an elaborated social identity explanation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 48, 834-849.

³⁸ LON1210110402: lines 451-460.

³⁹ Newburn, T. et al. (2011, December 6th). The four day truce: gangs suspended hostilities during the riots. *Guardian*.

⁴⁰ Stott et al. (2018) *op. cit.*

7. How did the riots begin?

7.1 Beyond 'any spark'

The 'spark' metaphor is one of the most common in the discourse of urban riots. It is often used to suggest that just any small incident can inflame a crowd to riot. But, as our previous work on the dynamics of riots has shown, the immediate pre-history of even the most violent riot is typically far more complex than this. Far from plunging immediately into mass violence, crowds and communities undertake a series of other actions before they resort to riot:

The Brixton riot of 1981 didn't start after Michael Bailey died - believed at the time to have been a consequence of police brutality. It started the following day after the police responded to the incidents the night before by increasing foot patrols and intensifying their operation 'Swamp 81' involving the heavy use of stop and search powers. The Broadwater Farm riot of 1985 in Tottenham didn't start after Cynthia Jarrett, a black woman, died as police raided her house, looking for her son Floyd. It happened after a peaceful march and demonstration, led by relatives, outside the local police station had brought no satisfactory answers.⁴¹

As is now well known, the 2011 riots didn't start immediately after Mark Duggan was shot and killed by police in Tottenham Hale. The killing took place on Thursday 4th August and the protest by family and friends at the lack of communication about the killing took place on Saturday 6th. The first riot began at the end of the protest on the Saturday.

What is more, there was a significant dynamic within the protest outside Tottenham police station that explains how the crowd became a riot, which is again more complex than the 'spark' metaphor. It was only at the point at which the police were seen to assault a young woman in the crowd that violence against them first became normative:⁴²

the riot did not immediately follow the shooting of Mark Duggan but emerged following extended interactions with the

police, characterised by failed communication and marginalisation of those seeking dialogue. ... The initial confrontations arose out of the intergroup interactions outside Tottenham Police Station wherein the police were perceived to have acted illegitimately and indiscriminately against people in the crowd.⁴³

We have shown across a range of types of crowd events - including football crowds, poll tax protests and student demonstrations - that the transition from a peaceful crowd event to a riot occurs through a clash of social-identity based definitions of legitimacy (e.g., 'our' right to protest, to have explanations) plus shifts in collective power from police to crowd.⁴⁴ The same was true of the start of the 2011 riots.

7.2 Demographic analysis shows that in many cases initial confrontation originated in some of the more deprived estates

Some examples illustrate the role of class in the initiation of the riots that followed Tottenham. In Brixton and Clapham, the initiation of rioting had a geographic relationship to particular deprived social housing estates. In Brixton, police entering the Moorlands Estate were attacked by a crowd which proceeded to drive them off and then began looting. Similarly in Clapham, police called to the Winstanley Estate, one of the most deprived estates in the borough, were attacked by rioters and then eventually forced to withdraw, at which point looting became prevalent. In the riot in Enfield, which took place on the second day of rioting (Sunday 8th), the profile of arrestee data reflected distinct east-west structural divisions in the borough. The interview and crime data confirm that these rioters travelled from poorer suburbs to the east and south. The location of Enfield Town was perhaps chosen because those from the poorer areas of the borough were aware of it as a frontier-town to the affluent suburbs to the west. In this sense, the town centre may have been an ideal location for a 'raid.'

⁴¹ Reicher & Stott (2011) *op. cit.*

⁴² Stott et al. (2018) *op. cit.*

⁴³ Stott et al. (2016) *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Reicher, S. (2001). The psychology of crowd dynamics. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes* (pp. 182-208). Oxford: Blackwell.

8. What do people do in a riot?

8.1 Beyond ‘mob mentality’: Targets of the rioters

The suggestion that what happened in the 2011 riots reflected a primitive ‘mob mentality’ was evident in statements that rioters ‘destroyed their own community’, gratuitously damaged ‘local shops’ and ‘family businesses’, and in the references to the effects of arson on private properties. Yet when we looked closely at the Home Office’s own data we found a more complex picture:

The ‘small independent retailers’ category (which principally comprised convenience shops, newsagents and off licences) so beloved of the media and politicians in the aftermath of August 2011 makes up a small minority of 9% of the 2,278 commercial properties that were attacked in total. It is also apparent that the vast majority of properties were targeted in order to obtain goods and cash, with electrical and clothing shops alone making up 22% of the total. Clearly, there was significant selectivity of targets rather than indiscriminate destruction.⁴⁵

It is true, however, that in some districts it appeared as if every car and every shop was targeted. We found this to be the case in a part of Enfield borough, for example, and it was also true of Ealing. Here the targeting seemed to be by location; this ‘*discriminating indiscrimination*’, as we have named it, seems to reflect class hatred rather than the other two key motivations found in the riots (i.e., to reverse power-relations with police and to acquire goods).

But what of the claims concerning the destruction of private dwellings? Here too the evidence was not as simple as suggested by the images of burning buildings used in so many mass media accounts to spin a story of random attacks on people’s homes:

Extensive analysis of the targets of the arsonists and ‘rioters’ in August has demonstrated that there were very few (if any) *selective* attacks on private homes. Take for example the figure of ‘*at least 100 families are thought to have been made homeless by arson and looting*’⁴⁶ which was quoted in several sources immediately after the August events. On closer examination this figure relates only two ‘riot’ locations in London; 55 private homes in Croydon and 45 in Tottenham.⁴⁷ Of these 100 properties, 26 lay above the Carpetright shop in Tottenham and the majority (if not all) in Croydon were damaged by a single fire set in the Reeves Furniture Store to which they were adjacent. Thus the greater part of the instances of arson affecting private homes were related to two fires (set in nearby commercial premises) in only two locations. It appears from the evidence that peoples’ homes were not the primary or even secondary targets for arson by ‘looters and rioters’ across the capital and the country; instead these incidents were more in line with the concept of (arguably non-intentional) collateral damage.⁴⁸

Lastly on this, too many accounts of damage and destruction assumed unitary motives in a crowd that was supposedly out of control. Our detailed examination of the data found more variability and complexity than this, however. Three brief examples will illustrate the point. First, when the initial rioting in Tottenham began to develop from the police focus to looting and other attacks on property, there were many in the crowd who opposed this and who wanted to keep the focus on the police.⁴⁹ Second, both in Tottenham and elsewhere there were many in the crowd who regulated the behaviour of others by directing them not to set fires or to select some targets and no others - famously, the Blackberry Messenger message to ‘dead the fires’ in Enfield was widely respected. Finally, some of the very people rescuing people from fires were rioters.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Ball & Drury (2012) *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/families-homeless-riots-compensated>. In fact, only 61 families required long-term alternative housing in London where the bulk of the arson occurred. Although the breakdown of this figure is unavailable it seems likely that the majority (if not all) of these incidents were related to the two large fires in Tottenham and Croydon (Riots, Communities and Victims Panel 2011 *op. cit.*).

⁴⁷ Only two other locations of private homes damaged by fire were mentioned in the sources, these were Southwark (London) and Birmingham where one household was affected in each case. The source gives no information on the former and a suggestion of a ‘racially motivated attack’ concerning the latter. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/families-homeless-riots-compensated>

⁴⁸ Ball & Drury (2012) *op. cit.*

⁴⁹ Stott et al. (2018) *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ See for example <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2r7i9q>

8.2 Shared alienation and hostility to the police were the basis of collective action

Research on groups has established that shared social identity makes collective behaviour possible,⁵¹ since it provides shared definitions of situations and common norms for acting within those situations.⁵² While interviewees were not asked directly about identity, there was evidence that they often saw those around them during the rioting as 'us' - as evidenced in the 'we'-talk.

Some were more explicit that it was the feelings they shared of being alienated and against the police precisely that was the basis of coordinated action - as in this example from Brixton:

A: everybody saw it, everyone felt the same way, everyone felt it was an advantage for us to do what we was gonna do. [] That teamwork, that was the connection everyone had.

Q. Would you have that usually amongst other people?

A. Nope.

Q. What do you think was special then?

A. The fact that we all felt each other's pain. It was just that, that's just the highlight of it, the fact that we just felt one another's pain, and we all thought, rah, like it's time to do something about it.⁵³

Shared assumptions about who 'we' are (as well as who 'they' are), enables people to act as one, since it means they can anticipate each other's actions and they expect support for actions in line with shared norms and values. This seems to have happened in the 2011 riots in the different patterns of behaviour observed, including confronting police, looting (where there was evidence of cooperation among participants who were strangers to each other), and the attacks on wealth.



Photo courtesy of PA Images

⁵¹ Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Basil Blackwell.

⁵² Reicher (1984) *op. cit.*

⁵³ LON2110110828 Lines 505-517

9. How do riots spread? Beyond 'contagion'

A key aim of our programme of research was to examine the processes by which the 2011 riots *spread*. Since the waves of urban riots in the USA in the 1960s, social scientists have tried to identify the predictors of such waves. From the 1970s onwards, research was able to show that, in addition to structural causes (such as deprivation), riots influenced each other: the occurrence of a riot in one location subsequently made rioting more likely in certain other locations. More recent research, using sophisticated modelling techniques, has shown that this influence process is actually one of the main predictors of rioting, and that the more intense the rioting the greater the influence.

But what is the process? Early accounts referred to 'contagion', and we saw this kind of explanation (alongside the related notion of 'copycat' behaviour) in commentaries during the 2011 riots.⁵⁴ More recent social science accounts reject the notion of mindlessness and irrationality, however. Instead, they suggest that influence between events can be explained as a 'rational choice' people make on seeing others benefit from participating in rioting.⁵⁵

But both irrationalist 'contagion' and rational-actor models fail to explain why some people and not others join in with rioting and why some people are more influential than others in a riot. There are different kinds of riot spread, and our research has analysed a number of them, drawing on the concepts of *identity* and *empowerment*.

9.1 Normative change and spread to contiguous locations during rioting

We examined the spread from Tottenham to adjacent districts in Haringey borough, and therefore the initial development from a community (or anti-police) riot to a 'commodity riot'. Police reinforcements dispersed the crowd north and south, away from Tottenham itself but closer to nearby retail parks. Change in crowd norms occurred from attacks on police to both looting and attacks on wealth. This took place through a 'positive feedback loop' of collective empowerment; in realizing their anti-police aims, rioters both revealed and created

police vulnerability. This new police vulnerability was the premise for the new collective actions:

The drivers of collective action subsequently appeared to change, and the event went beyond a reactive riot toward proactive rioting against targets that seem to relate to longer term structural grievances (e.g., wealth inequality, antagonism toward the 'establishment'). ... this normative transformation corresponded with a subjective sense of collective agency that emerged over time directly from the ongoing identity-based intergroup dynamics of the anti-police riot on the High Road.⁵⁶

A similar pattern occurred within the Enfield riot the following day, and again police dispersal played a role. Initially, the events in Enfield town centre were characterized by anti-police initiatives, such as damaging shops to draw police in, followed by looting. The ensuing dispersal by police westwards into the wealthier areas of Enfield Town, and a larger group eastward towards the retail parks, led to differing behaviours beyond the initial anti-police action. As mentioned earlier (8.1 'Beyond mob mentality'), those travelling to the wealthier areas engaged in a 'class riot',⁵⁷ characterised by arson attacks on cars and damage to residential property, both identifiable as symbols of affluence. Those in the retail parks instead engaged in systematically looting the higher-end retailers of clothing and electrical goods with relative impunity.

9.2 Spread of events to non-contiguous locations: A new explanation

We found evidence - for example in the arrest data - that part of the diffusion of rioting from the initial events in Haringey to the nearby borough of Enfield on day two was in terms of travelling by participants who had been involved in - and empowered by - the events in Haringey the day before.

However, our main focus was spread between non-contiguous locations to people who hadn't previously been involved, and where there was no such travelling. To look at this, we analysed data from

⁵⁴ Pilkington, D. (2011, November 14th). Rioting in London sparked 'copycat' behaviour. *Independent*; Slutkin, G. (2011, August 14th). Rioting is a disease spread from person to person – the key is to stop the infection. *Guardian*.

⁵⁵ Myers, D. (2010). Violent protest and heterogeneous diffusion processes: The spread of US racial rioting from 1964 to 1971. *Mobilization* 15(3), 289-321.

⁵⁶ Stott et al. (2018) *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ Ball and Drury (2012) *op. cit.*

three South London locations that saw rioting in the days following Tottenham - Brixton, Croydon and Clapham (see Figure 1). There was significant variability in the timing of the rioting in these locations, which requires explanation: Brixton occurred the day after Haringey and was the first location in South London to riot; Croydon and Clapham happened the day after Brixton. While many riots took place across London on the third day of rioting, Croydon was the biggest riot.

9.2.1 Shared identity and self-relevance as a basis of collective empowerment and spread

The killing by police of Mark Duggan had an influence on people beyond Tottenham, but there were important variations in that influence. More Brixton interviewees than those participating in the other South London riots saw the killing of Mark Duggan in Tottenham as relevant to their community, based on a common identification as Black in relation to the police; they were more likely to describe anger and a sense of injustice as their motivation for participation, and refer to a history of conflictual relations with police that was similar to that in Tottenham.

Fewer Croydon and Clapham interviewees than Brixton identified with Tottenham. However, there was evidence from across the three locations that, because interviewees identified as anti-police, they were empowered and emboldened by perceived police vulnerability created in the previous riot(s) - particularly by the Monday.

In addition, interviewees from all three riots also referred to their expectations that people in their networks and communities would participate in rioting. For Croydon and Clapham interviewees more than Brixton participants, this expectation was based on this perception of police vulnerability. Where there was strong evidence of shared identity for Croydon and Clapham rioters - in the form of 'we'-talk for example - it was within these local networks.

The evidence of differential identification with Tottenham therefore helps explain the *sequence* of events - the fact that Brixton occurred on Sunday 7th August, while Croydon and Clapham occurred later, on Monday 8th. That is, while the Brixton riot was influenced by events in Tottenham, the Croydon




Figure 1. Boroughs of Greater London, showing locations included in the analysis of spread in London
Map courtesy of Richard Grove

and Clapham riots were more influenced by the totality of riots that had occurred by Sunday night.

Given that the *Reading the Riots* interview sample were mostly riot participants, and that anti-police sentiment was so common amongst them, these data do not allow us to compare systematically with people who were pro-police or non-participants. However, given the links between anti-police sentiments and the forms of action in the riots, a reasonable hypothesis is that the people empowered by previous riots were those who were (a) anti-police and (b) had supportive anti-police networks. This would help explain why, while many people heard about the riots, only some people joined in with them. It is also consistent with the analysis of the police survey data comparing boroughs that did and did not riot (6.2.3 above).

9.2.2 Interaction within the group mediates influence of events

A further important difference between Brixton and the other two locations that seems to help explain the sequence of events was the occurrence of Splash in Brixton, a music festival, which brought together thousands of people under the theme of Black African-Caribbean culture, making salient the very identity that linked Tottenham and Brixton. At Splash, people not only spoke to others who shared the same sense of injustice as they did, they could also see that some of these others were ready to act on

this. While shared anger at the injustice legitimized participation, shared expectations of widespread involvement empowered it. Croydon and Clapham interviewees' interaction took place mostly by phone, social media and in small groups rather than in a crowd, which may have made the practical task of coordination slower.

9.2.3 Power reversal of the police is the catalyst for mass participation and looting

At each location we looked at, the catalyst that transformed minor skirmishes into full-scale rioting was the actions of a relatively small group initiating conflict with police (see 7.2, above). The secondary convergence of many others to the riot location occurred after this conflict when police were forced to retreat and appeared vulnerable.

9.3 Some police tactics inadvertently facilitated spread

In addition to the identity-based social influence processes between rioters at different events outlined above, there was also evidence that various police decisions and tactics inadvertently facilitated spread. For example, in Enfield, in the hours before the riots, police cleared the town centre, inadvertently signalling to potential rioters the location where rioting would take place. A similar process to this took place in Croydon and Clapham. The situation in Croydon was compounded by a decision to send police officers to other boroughs.



Photo courtesy of AP Images

In other places, there was a different kind of process. In Brixton, police feared that there would be confrontation at the Splash event, and so police resources were deployed into the area. However, this badly backfired. On the one hand, the police intervention was seen as an illegitimate transgression. On the other hand, its ineffectualness gave people confidence that the police would be unable to prevent a riot.

In Hackney, there was a parallel process. Police responded to events in other London districts over the weekend in a proactive manner, by targeting areas of Hackney they had concerns about. They not only increased personnel in the area, but also were perceived to increase 'stop and search' - one of the

very issues that prompted so many people to become involved in the previous two nights:

If the previous riots had made many young people, especially black youth, more suspicious of them, so it is likely that they made the police more suspicious of those congregating on the streets. Moreover, in the light of emerging criticisms of 'soft policing' in Tottenham and elsewhere,⁵⁸ the pressure on officers was to be more, rather than less, interventionist. In such a climate, it was all too easy for mutual distrust and expectation to turn into the dynamics of conflict.⁵⁹

In short, some police tactics intended to prevent rioting seem to have facilitated rioting.



Photo courtesy of Reuters Pictures

⁵⁸ For instance, a headline in the daily *Telegraph* on the morning of August 8th was 'Tottenham riots: police let gangs run riot and loot' – see <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8687540/Tottenham-riots-police-let-gangs-run-riot-and-loot.htm>

⁵⁹ Stott et al. (2016) *op. cit.*

10. Conclusions

A wave of riots cannot be dismissed as a blip. Such events tell us about profound problems in a society. This is why so many waves of riots lead to policy responses, whether in the price of bread in eighteenth century France⁶⁰ or in 21st century France where President Macron reluctantly scrapped a fuel tax following *gilets jaunes* riots.⁶¹ Riots are therefore a resource for learning about social groups, their collective power, and their psychology.

There are three key conclusions that can be drawn from this work-in-progress on the social context and social psychology of the 2011 wave of riots.

10.1 The need for an evidence-based approach

It is significant, we think, that the analysis presented here differs markedly from those publications, pronouncements and policies that have been based on assumptions rather than evidence. Where there is overlap here with other analysis of the riots it is with those studies employing large data-sets. Both the mass media and politicians suggested solutions before they even had the evidence, leading to hasty and ill-judged policy initiatives aimed more at saying 'we are doing something' than doing something useful.

10.2 A new understanding of riot spread

The language of 'contagion' is both pathologizing and misleading as a way of talking about the spread of riots, including those that took place in England in 2011. We have argued that a new way of talking and thinking is needed, and our research suggests some of the elements of this. To talk about a wave of riots, we should refer not to 'contagion' but to 'spread', 'influence', or 'interdependence'. These terms are less loaded. They do not imply sickness, primitive psychology, or mindlessness.

For the process *underlying* the spread of riots from location to location, we suggest a new model of identity-based collective empowerment. People are discriminating in who is relevant to them, who they

attend to, who influences them, and in what they do in response to exposure. Their actions are based on their sense of who they are, who the 'other' is, in shared understandings of appropriate conduct, and shared expectations about social support and co-action. We have shown that these concepts help make sense of the pattern of behaviour and some of the sequences of events.

10.3 Implications for policy and practice

This programme of work is essentially about compiling evidence, providing the best analysis, and developing theory to understand the riots of 2011 and their spread. It is not a policy-based initiative or attempt to recommend future practices.

Nevertheless, given that policy and practice requires evidence, and that this research programme has now provided significant evidence, some practical implications can perhaps be drawn. A first practical implication is that the practice of 'stop and search' is clearly a problem not a solution. It is not going to be effective - except as a way of focusing the sense of rage and injustice felt by many young people (and particularly working class and Black young people) towards the police and towards authorities in general.

The second practical implication is perhaps so obvious we should not need to spell it out here. When police shoot people dead, this may not lead directly to riots; but such events are a potent icon or symbol of wider relations of injustice that motivate people to riot. Clearly the police failure to communicate in the days after the killing was crucial in explaining the emergence of protest and then rioting in Tottenham. But for many people outside Tottenham (particularly in Brixton), it was the killing itself that was the focus; and it was the Brixton riot and others on the Sunday that empowered those that rioted on the Monday. In sum, without the killing, the August 2011 wave of riots would not have happened when they did, and may not have happened at all.

⁶⁰ Rudé, G. (1964). *The crowd in history: A study of popular disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848*. New York: Wiley.

⁶¹ Willsher, K. (2018, December 5th). Macron scraps fuel tax rise in face of *gilets jaunes* protests. *Guardian*

Contact details

Beyond Contagion website: <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/beyondcontagion>

Twitter: [@BeyondContagion](https://twitter.com/BeyondContagion)

John Drury (University of Sussex) j.drury@sussex.ac.uk

Clifford Stott (Keele University) c.stott@keele.ac.uk

Stephen Reicher (St Andrews University) sdr@st-andrews.ac.uk

Roger Ball (Keele University, University of Sussex) r.ball@sussex.ac.uk

Fergus Neville (St Andrews University) fgn@st-andrews.ac.uk



University of
St Andrews

