



Solving a Spatial Evolutionary Game in Prostate Cancer

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Linking structure and evolution

Cancer cell phenotypes vary in space;
spatial evolution can explain this



Our model provides a pithy presentation for a
complex relationship between spatial structure
and evolution

Evolutionary games model tumor development

Evolutionary game⁽¹⁾ between stromal cells
(S), stromal dependent prostate cancer cells
(D), and stromal independent prostate cancer
cells (I)

$$\begin{matrix} & S & D & I \\ \begin{matrix} S \\ D \\ I \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \alpha & 0 \\ 1 + \alpha - \beta & 1 - 2\beta & 1 - \beta + \rho \\ 1 - \gamma & 1 - \gamma & 1 - \gamma \end{pmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

α = benefit derived by stromal cells from dependent cells
 β = cost of being dependent
 ρ = benefit derived by dependent cells from independent
cells
 γ = cost of being independent

Space allows new population dynamics

		New spatial dynamics	
Attractor:		●	
Unstable attractor:		●	
I is always attractor in S-I subgame			
		D-I Subgame	
		Mixed subgame attractor	
All D		All I	
greater		lesser	
$\beta = \frac{(9\gamma+5\rho)}{13}$		$\beta = \frac{(9\gamma+\rho)}{17}$	
Unstable		Stable	
		$\beta(52\alpha - 36\gamma + 13\rho + 36) - 4\alpha(9\gamma + 5\rho) + \rho(-45\gamma - 5\rho + 36) = 0$	
S-D Subgame	All D	Not Present	Not Present
	Unstable	Not Present	Not Present
	Stable	Not Present	Not Present
	All S	Not Present	Not Present

Space reduces interactions between individual cells

ON^(2,3) transform with the largest effect of space: 3
interactions (k = 3) with death-birth dynamics.


$$ON_k = A + \frac{1}{k-2} (\Delta 1^T - 1 \Delta^T) + \frac{1}{(k+1)(k-2)} (A - A^T)$$

In original game every cell interacts with every other
cell in the total population; spatial game each cell
interacts with exactly 3 other cells

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & -\frac{5}{4} + \alpha + \frac{9\beta}{4} & \frac{5}{4}(1-\gamma) \\ \frac{9}{4} + \alpha - \frac{13\beta}{4} & 1 - 2\beta & \frac{1}{4}(4 - 13\beta + 5\gamma + 5\rho) \\ -\frac{9}{4}(1-\gamma) & \frac{1}{4}(4 + 9\beta - 9\gamma - \rho) & 1 - \gamma \end{pmatrix}$$

Subgames give intuitive solutions

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & \alpha & 0 \\ 1 + \alpha - \beta & 1 - 2\beta & 1 - \beta + \rho \\ 1 - \gamma & 1 - \gamma & 1 - \gamma \end{pmatrix}$$



Subgame

$$\begin{matrix} & S & D \\ \begin{matrix} S \\ D \end{matrix} & \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \alpha \\ 1 + \alpha - \beta & 1 - 2\beta \end{pmatrix} \end{matrix}$$

$(1 + \alpha - \beta) - (0) > 0$ D invades S
 $(\alpha) - (1 - 2\beta) > 0$ S invades D

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