

Online Appendices

This file contains two appendices: In addition to descriptive statistics and the list of observations included in the main analysis (in Appendix A1), the following appendices starting with “A” provide tables and figures displaying results from robustness tests and extensions mentioned in the paper. Appendix B includes a shortened and anonymized version of the SPaW codebook.

APPENDIX A

Descriptive statistics and robustness tests

The order of the “A” Appendices is as follows: Appendix A1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables entering our baseline model. A2 shows results from “naïve” specifications excluding the interaction term between electoral system and agricultural share of income. A3 shows results from a selected set of core specification tests mentioned, but not reported, in the paper. These tests include an OLS version of the benchmark, a logit model on the adoption of new welfare programs, tests separating between majoritarian and semi-PR systems, tests substituting the agricultural share of income measure with an alternative proxy (Urbanization), as well as tests on a historical/pre-1960 sample.

Thereafter, in Appendix A4, we probe the relevance of the control variable set. Specifically, we display our core results from Table 1 hold up when excluding the lagged dependent variable from the regressions. A4 also reports models with additional controls, including federalism, parliamentarianism and clientelist vs programmatic linkages between parties and their constituents. Finally, we present specifications controlling also for an interaction between electoral system and GDP per capita.

Appendix A5 shows results for alternative/more restrictive samples. Specifically, we present presents models using the Boix et al. (2012) measure of democracy or a stricter threshold-criterion on the Polity index for counting democracies (and thus for being included in the analysis). We also displays results for sub-samples of countries with relatively high and relatively low land inequality, as measured by Vanhanen’s family farms measure, and models controlling for or splitting the sample according to the volume of wheat production. The Appendix also contains results from models run only on OECD-countries and only on non-OECD countries, respectively.

Appendix A6 presents tests of our main hypotheses using alternative welfare state measures. Finally, A7 shows results from the extension checking whether the interaction pattern found for welfare state policy is also present for another theoretically relevant, but different outcome, namely restrictions on international trade.

In addition to these tests, we note that we tried to deal with the possible endogeneity of electoral systems by running instrumental variable models. Models accounting for both country- and time-fixed effects provide a strong test; they account, e.g., for the possibility that our results are driven by particular countries being more likely to adopt PR and promote welfare legislation for various other reasons. To further account for potential endogeneity biases, particularly related to endogenous adoption of electoral systems (Cusack, Iversen, & Soskice, 2010), we tested instrumental variable models. Finding instruments for electoral system that are both strong and valid has proven hard (see Acemoglu, 2005). Still, we tried out various combinations of the suggested instruments from Persson & Tabellini (2003), related for example to the last time point of constitutional change (thus using global constitutional fashions as exogenous variation). We tested different panel data 2SLS specifications, without lagged dependent variables, which all replicate the highly significant interaction term, as predicted by our argument and Hypothesis 3. Further, the signs of the linear PR and agricultural income share terms correspond with those in our baseline Model 2, Table 1 and are highly significant. The instruments often turn out strong. Nonetheless, Sargan tests suggest that the exclusion restriction may not hold in any of the models we tested, and this – taken together with the previous criticisms of these instruments (Acemoglu, 2005) as well as the point estimates often being implausibly large – makes us not trust these specifications, and we therefore do not report them.

Appendix A1: Sample and descriptive statistics

Table A.I. Observations included in Model 5, Table 1

Country	First	Last
Albania	1992	2002
Argentina	1937	2002
Armenia	1998	2002
Australia	1920	2002
Austria	1920	2002
Bangladesh	1991	2000
Belgium	1870	2002
Belarus	1992	1994
Benin	1991	1999
Bolivia	1982	2002
Botswana	1966	1991
Brazil	1946	2002
Bulgaria	1990	2002
Burkina Faso	1978	1979
Central African Republic	1993	2002
Chile	1874	2002
Colombia	1870	2002
Congo	1992	1996
Costa Rica	1920	2002
Cyprus	1960	2002
Czechoslovakia/Czech Rep.	1919	2002
Cuba	1909	1951
Denmark	1919	2002
Dominican Republic	1963	2002
Ecuador	1968	2002
El Salvador	1984	2002
Estonia	1992	2002
Fiji	1970	2002
Finland	1919	2002
France	1877	2002
Gambia	1988	1993
Georgia	1998	2002
Germany	1991	2002
Ghana	1970	2002
Great Britain	1870	2002
Greece	1870	2002
Guatemala	1946	2000
Guyana	1992	2002
Haiti	1990	1998
Honduras	1930	2002
Hungary	1990	2002
India	1950	2002
Indonesia	1949	2000
Iran	1997	2002
Ireland	1922	1999

Israel	1948	2002
Italy	1948	2002
Ivory Coast	2000	2002
Japan	1952	2002
Jamaica	1962	2002
Kenya	2002	2002
Latvia	1996	2002
Lebanon	1970	1974
Lesotho	1968	1969
Lithuania	1991	2002
Madagascar	1992	2002
Malawi	1994	1999
Mali	1992	2002
Mauritius	1988	2002
Mexico	1994	2002
Moldova	1998	2002
Myanmar	1948	1961
Nepal	1990	2000
Netherlands	1919	2002
New Zealand	1920	1938
Nicaragua	1990	2002
Niger	1992	2002
Nigeria	1979	2002
Norway	1905	2002
Papua New Guinea	1988	2002
Pakistan	1973	1998
Panama	1955	2002
Paraguay	1992	2002
Peru	1950	2002
Philippines	1950	2002
Poland	1920	2002
Portugal	1911	2002
Romania	1990	2002
Russia	1997	2002
Senegal	2000	2002
Sierra Leone	1961	2002
Somalia	1968	1968
Slovak Republic	1994	2002
Slovenia	1993	2002
South Korea	1988	2002
Spain	1879	2002
Sri-Lanka	1948	2002
Sudan	1956	1988
Sweden	1919	2002
Switzerland	1870	2002
Taiwan	1998	1998
Thailand	1974	2002
Trinidad and Tobago	1962	2002
Turkey	1946	2002
Uganda	1980	1984
Ukraine	1992	2002

Uruguay	1919	2002
USA	1870	2002
Venezuela	1958	2002
Zambia	1991	1995

Notes: For the sake of an easier overview, we here provide the first and last year a country enters the sample. There are instances where a country drops out for some years, to thereafter return (for instance because of missing values or because the country turns non-democratic according to the classification/cut-off point used, namely Polity2 score \geq 3). The precisely specified sample is available on request.

Table A.II. Descriptive statistics restricted to the 3084 observations entering our baseline model (Model 2, in Table 1).

	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Number major welfare programs	4.096	2.015	0	6
Agriculture income/GDP	30.703	22.911	0.00	93.00
Proportional Representation (dummy)	0.514	0.500	0	1
GDP/capita (logged)	8.616	0.900	5.790	10.445
Openness (imports+exports/GDP)	0.152	0.198	0.002	1.592




Figure A.I. Distributions of observations across Agricultural income/GDP, by electoral system category.

Appendix A2: Models without interaction terms

Table A.III. Rural interests, electoral systems and enactment of major welfare laws (dependent variable), 1871-2002. Specifications without interaction terms.

	(1)	(2)
Agricultural Income/GDP	-0.00106*** (-5.50)	-0.00101*** (-3.39)
PR	0.00939* (2.24)	0.0948*** (3.89)
Trade Openness	-0.0333*** (-3.59)	-0.0572** (-2.96)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0590*** (-10.16)	-0.0736*** (-4.35)
Lagged Dependent Variable	0.282*** (64.80)	0.276*** (19.66)
Country Dummies	No	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	3084	3084
Pseudo R^2	0.299	0.302
AIC	9594.1	9745.9

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Negative binomial models calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors, with number of major welfare laws as dependent variable. Constant, country, and period dummies excluded.

Appendix A3: Core specification tests

Table A.IV. A selection of core robustness tests.

	(1) No period dummies	(2) OLS with PCSE	(3) Logit on (at least) one new program	(4) Control only for Family Farms	(5) Extensive model omitting obs. w. max nr. programs	(6) Separating out Semi-PR systems	(7) Urbanization proxy rural strength	(8) Historical sample 1870-1959
Agricultural Income/GDP	-0.00847*** (-9.48)	-0.00298*** (-4.42)	-0.131*** (-3.77)	-0.00562*** (-7.82)	-0.0180*** (-4.31)	-0.00744*** (-6.77)		-0.0267*** (-7.07)
PR	-0.0910* (-2.48)	0.0486 (1.42)	0.207 (0.14)	-0.0491 (-1.66)	-0.521** (-2.87)	-0.141** (-3.29)	0.291*** (7.84)	-0.917*** (-8.15)
PR*Agricultural Income/GDP	0.00999*** (12.22)	0.00289*** (4.09)	0.0769** (2.65)	0.00539*** (8.39)	0.0169*** (3.65)	0.00757*** (7.54)		0.0301*** (10.43)
Trade Openness	0.0170 (0.87)	-0.0873* (-2.49)	-8.071* (-2.29)	0.00785 (0.45)	-1.065** (-3.14)	0.00384 (0.21)	-0.00752 (-0.42)	-3.918*** (-5.70)
GDP/cap (logged)	-0.0993*** (-5.68)	0.0610** (3.27)	0.170 (0.22)	-0.0740*** (-4.19)	-0.116 (-1.68)	-0.0693*** (-4.30)	-0.0707*** (-4.38)	-0.164* (-2.55)
LDV	0.372*** (31.14)	0.932*** (118.97)	-1.182*** (-5.04)	0.264*** (18.59)	0.237*** (8.88)	0.267*** (19.22)	0.258*** (18.14)	0.439*** (23.34)
Family Farms				-0.00298*** (-8.13)	0.00133 (0.76)			
Union Density					-0.000173 (-0.19)			
Democracy (BMR)					-0.266** (-2.59)			
Population (logged)					0.319** (2.59)			
Government Spending/GDP					3.47 e-07*** (3.64)			
Semi-PR						-0.134** (-2.77)		
Semi-PR*Agric. Inc/GDP						0.00372*** (3.29)		
Urbanization							0.00405*** (5.12)	
PR*Urbanization							-0.00448*** (-8.57)	
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	3084	3084	2317	3047	592	3084	3193	1125
Pseudo R ²	0.283		0.214	0.306	0.266	0.303	0.304	0.400
AIC	9983.7	.	614.9	9607.0	1860.7	9739.1	10055.0	3034.9

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. *t* statistics in parentheses. Constant, country, and period dummies excluded. Model 1 and 4-7 are negative binomial models calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors, Model 2 is OLS with panel-corrected standard errors and a common Ar(1) error correction term, and Model 3 is a logit with clustered errors, with the dependent variable being a dummy scored 1 at least one new major welfare program is added in that year. Dependent variable is number of major welfare programs enacted across six social policy areas in all models except Model 3.




Figure A.II. The conditional marginal effect of Agricultural income/GDP over electoral systems on the number of predicted major welfare laws with 95% CI. The predictions are based on Model 6, Table A.IV. All covariates are at their means.




Figure A.III. The Conditional Marginal effect of Electoral systems over agrarian share of GDP on the number of predicted major welfare laws with 95% CI. The predictions are based on Model 6, Table A.IV. All covariates are at their means.

Appendix A4: Alternative control variable sets

Table A.V. Excluding lagged dependent variable from models in Table 1 of the paper.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Agric. income/GDP	-0.00610*** (-9.51)	-0.0109*** (-10.48)	-0.00693*** (-5.94)	-0.0117*** (-6.31)
PR	0.156*** (9.24)	0.0163 (0.40)	-0.0277 (-0.31)	-0.114* (-2.46)
PR*Agric. income/GDP	0.00298*** (5.17)	0.00867*** (9.32)	0.00628*** (4.96)	0.00685*** (5.83)
Trade Openness	-0.145*** (-5.62)	-0.209*** (-9.80)	0.425*** (4.89)	0.0935*** (3.38)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.108*** (8.18)	-0.0515* (-2.21)	-0.0693 (-1.88)	-0.00421 (-0.11)
Union Density				0.000705 (1.80)
Democracy (BMR)				-0.109 (-1.26)
Population (logged)				0.437*** (8.20)
Family Farms				-0.00467*** (-8.57)
Gov. spending/GDP				-1.99e-08* (-2.12)
Country Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3087	3087	1995	1289
Pseudo R^2	0.229	0.287	0.322	0.192
AIC	10557.8	9955.9	5786.5	4482.1

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Negative binomial models calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors. Dependent variable is number of major welfare programs enacted across six social policy areas.

Table A.VI. Controlling for federalism and parliamentarism

	(1) Institutional controls	(2) Institutional controls	(3) Instit. + other controls
Agricult. inc./GDP	-0.00955*** (-9.928)	-0.00654*** (-8.436)	-0.00711*** (-5.539)
PR	-0.122** (-3.163)	-0.119*** (-3.938)	-0.136*** (-4.467)
PR*Agricult. inc./GDP	0.0112*** (12.485)	0.00700*** (9.737)	0.00578*** (6.411)
Hybrid (Federal-unitary)	0.0309 (1.056)	-0.0150 (-0.718)	-0.0273 (-1.557)
Federal	0.00280 (0.062)	0.00442 (0.169)	-0.00826 (-0.379)
Semi-Presidential	0.0810** (3.206)	0.0874*** (4.418)	0.0634*** (3.742)
Parliamentary	0.0926** (2.846)	0.0539* (2.293)	0.0566* (2.190)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0915*** (-5.008)	-0.0700*** (-4.189)	-0.0676** (-2.941)
Trade Openness	0.00645 (0.275)	-0.000243 (-0.013)	0.0789*** (5.307)
LDV	0.367*** (29.993)	0.264*** (18.776)	0.204*** (13.360)
Union Density			-0.0000357 (-0.161)
Democracy (BMR)			-0.151** (-2.821)
Population (logged)			0.176*** (5.525)
Family Farms			-0.00254*** (-6.784)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3071	3071	1535
Pseudo R^2	0.284	0.304	0.179
AIC	9943.1	9699.9	5339.3

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Constant, country, and period dummies excluded. Negative binomial models calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors. Dependent variable is number of major welfare programs enacted across six social policy areas. Reference categories are presidential system, unitary state, majoritarian system.

Table A.VII. Controlling for programmatic vs clientelist linkages between parties and their constituencies, using v2psprlnks from V-Dem.

	(1) Period-FE	(2) Country-FE	(3) Both FEs
Agricultural Income/GDP	-0.00212*** (-7.75)	-0.00725*** (-8.49)	-0.00510*** (-7.13)
PR	-0.0376*** (-6.24)	-0.0737* (-2.08)	-0.0271 (-0.97)
PR*Agricultural Income/GDP	0.00199*** (8.46)	0.00887*** (11.36)	0.00505*** (7.89)
Trade Openness	-0.00420 (-0.43)	-0.00723 (-0.38)	0.0195 (1.15)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0756*** (-10.03)	-0.0910*** (-5.42)	-0.0860*** (-5.28)
Programmatic (high value) vs clientelist linkages	0.00932*** (3.93)	0.0509*** (4.42)	0.036*** (4.47)
LDV	0.280*** (64.79)	0.354*** (29.83)	0.266*** (19.15)
Country Dummies	No	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3004	3004	3004
Pseudo R^2	0.281	0.266	0.285
AIC	9453.5	9826.1	9629.3

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Constant, country, and period dummies excluded. Negative binomial models calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors. The dependent variable is number of major welfare laws enacted. Unfortunately, a similar model simultaneously incorporating both country- and period-dummies did not converge.

Table A.VIII. Controlling for interaction between GDP per capita and electoral system in different specifications.

	No FEs	Time FEs	Country FEs	Benchmark
Agricult. inc./GDP	-0.00108* (-2.15)	-0.00215*** (-5.39)	-0.00579*** (-5.62)	-0.00532*** (-6.42)
PR	0.536*** (4.20)	-0.103 (-1.06)	1.136*** (5.21)	0.0613 (0.40)
PR*Agricult. inc./GDP	0.00123* (2.19)	0.00211*** (4.87)	0.00586*** (5.32)	0.00538*** (6.36)
PR*GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0634*** (-4.87)	0.00676 (0.69)	-0.128*** (-5.74)	-0.0145 (-0.93)
Trade Openness	0.0889*** (7.74)	-0.00418 (-0.43)	0.0509** (2.59)	0.00811 (0.41)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0640*** (-5.18)	-0.0683*** (-6.99)	-0.0277 (-1.20)	-0.0675*** (-3.46)
LDV	0.352*** (67.02)	0.281*** (65.09)	0.373*** (31.18)	0.269*** (19.06)
Country Dummies	No	No	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	3084	3084	3084	3084
Pseudo R^2	0.269	0.299	0.283	0.303
<i>AIC</i>	9969.1	9594.0	9981.2	9738.7

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Constant, country-, and period dummies excluded from the table. Negative binomial models calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors. The dependent variable is number of major welfare laws enacted.

Appendix A5: Alternative, more restricted samples

Table A.IX. Tests where samples are restricted relative to the benchmark (Model 2, Table 1) by using stricter operationalizations for a country being considered as democratic. Negative binomial regressions.

	BMR democracies	Polity 2 score ≥ 6
Agricult. inc./GDP	-0.00786*** (-8.32)	-0.00796*** (-7.07)
PR	0.0360 (0.94)	0.0590 (1.51)
PR*Agricult. inc./GDP	0.00647*** (7.34)	0.00692*** (6.62)
Trade Openness	-0.216*** (-11.17)	-0.156*** (-8.23)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.000229 (-0.01)	0.000994 (0.04)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	2749	2436
Pseudo R^2	0.228	0.256
AIC	9220.8	8061.0

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. BMR sample restricted to all observations scoring 1 (Democracy) in Boix et. al. democracy measure. Polity 2 sample restricted to all observations scoring above 6 on the polity 2 index. Constant, country, and period dummies excluded. Negative binomial regressions calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors, and number of major welfare programs is dependent variable. NB: Since the benchmark model for the BMR-restricted sample did not converge, these specifications are run without lagged dependent variables.

Table A.X. Split-sample tests on high and low land inequality settings using negative binomial regression on baseline model (Model 2, Table 1).

	(1) High Land Inequality	(2) Low Land Inequality
Agricultural inc./GDP	-0.00178*** (-3.52)	-0.0211** (-3.28)
PR	-0.0574* (-2.40)	-0.0209 (-0.06)
PR*Agricultural inc./GDP	0.00294*** (5.72)	0.0168* (2.56)
Trade Openness	-0.0202 (-1.25)	-0.119 (-0.78)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0170 (-1.25)	-0.184 (-1.73)
LDV	0.264*** (19.64)	0.127*** (5.14)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	2643	437
Pseudo R^2	0.251	0.484
<i>AIC</i>	8656.3	1051.6

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Low (high) inequality is defined as below (above) the mean in Vanhanen's share of family farms measure in the year 1871 (19 %). Negative binomial regressions calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors, and number of major welfare programs is dependent variable. Constant, country-, and period dummies excluded.

Table A.XI. Controlling for wheat production, and split samples according to median volume of wheat production in the sample.

Sample:	Full	Low wheat	High wheat
Agricultural income./GDP	-0.00200*** (-4.03)	-0.00213*** (-3.98)	-0.00182** (-2.76)
PR	-0.0257* (-2.27)	-0.116*** (-3.31)	-0.000588 (-0.11)
PR*Agricultural inc./GDP	0.00215*** (4.28)	0.00264*** (3.79)	0.00136* (2.21)
Wheat production	-6.40e-10 (-1.79)		
Trade Openness	-0.0148 (-0.91)	0.00408 (0.14)	-0.0449** (-2.97)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.063*** (3.77)	0.076** (2.61)	0.013 (0.59)
LDV	0.149*** (5.61)	0.176*** (4.26)	0.0911*** (4.43)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1348	674	674

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Low/High Wheat samples include observations that score, respectively, below- and above the median wheat production volume in the sample. Negative binomial regressions calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors, and number of major welfare programs is dependent variable. Please note that there are fewer observations in these models than our baseline due to missing data on wheat production Constant, country-, and period dummies excluded.

Table A.XII. Co current OECD countries (1) or non-OECD countries (2), using Negative Binominal regression.

	(1) OECD	(2) Non-OECD
Agricult. inc./GDP	-0.00961*** (-3.627)	-0.00325*** (-5.316)
PR	-0.195*** (-3.296)	0.00380 (0.126)
PR*Agricult. inc./GDP	0.00796*** (4.031)	0.00303*** (4.939)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.122** (-3.119)	-0.0557** (-2.612)
Trade Openness	0.0503 (1.383)	0.0582 (1.871)
LDV	0.265*** (13.889)	0.228*** (11.166)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes
Period Dummies	Yes	Yes
Observations	1210	1874
Pseudo R^2	0.374	0.255
AIC	3677.2	6048.6

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Constant, time trend, country, and period dummies excluded. Negative binomial regressions calculated with Huber sandwich standard errors, and number of major welfare programs is dependent variable.

Appendix A6: Alternative welfare measures

Table A.XIII. Rural interests, electoral systems, and coverage rates for various major welfare programs; 21 countries from 1930-2000. Estimated with OLS and panel corrected standard errors.

Dep. var	(1) Pensions coverage	(2) Unemployment coverage	(3) Sickness coverage	(4) Accident coverage
Agricult. inc./GDP	-0.00731* (-2.426)	-0.0166*** (-3.912)	-0.0146** (-2.719)	-0.00419 (-1.602)
PR	-0.0167 (-0.358)	-0.0366 (-0.672)	0.353*** (5.005)	-0.0168 (-0.455)
PR* Agricult. inc./GDP	0.0106*** (3.797)	0.0130*** (3.658)	0.00600 (1.315)	0.00451* (2.163)
GDP/capita (logged)	-0.0224 (-0.329)	0.261*** (4.059)	0.129 (1.904)	0.0159 (0.337)
Trade Openness	0.398*** (9.045)	0.121* (2.057)	0.0181 (0.264)	0.196*** (5.198)
Observations	251	256	256	256

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. t statistics in parentheses. Time unit for each panel is 5-year period. Coverage rate data are taken from Korpi & Palme (2007). Models calculated with panel-corrected standard errors.

Appendix A7: Trade policy; is the interaction pattern found for welfare state policy also present for restrictions on international trade?

Table A.XIV. Rural interests, electoral systems, and total amount of taxes on international trade (dependent variable), 1949-2002, 82 countries. Fixed effects regressions estimated with OLS and panel corrected standard errors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Agricult. inc./GDP	-0.0770*** (-15.09)	0.0153* (2.39)	0.0246** (3.06)	0.0304** (3.05)	0.0301** (3.05)
PR	1.850*** (7.48)	0.174 (0.46)	0.292 (0.77)	0.284 (0.55)	-0.146 (-0.27)
PR*Agricult. inc./GDP		-0.0202** (-2.58)	-0.0278** (-3.24)	-0.0315** (-3.16)	-0.0326*** (-3.36)
GDP (log)			0.826** (2.76)	0.929** (2.96)	0.731* (2.37)
Trade Openness				-1.119 (-1.75)	-0.492 (-0.75)
Family Farms					0.0620*** (6.54)
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1214	1214	1214	1179	1172
R ²	0.694	0.808	0.809	0.810	0.814

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. *t* statistics in parentheses. Constant and fixed effects dummies excluded. Models calculated with panel-corrected standard errors.